Weber and Kelsen avoided the terms Rechtsstaat and Rule of Law, but they each painstakingly constructed alternative descriptions of the kind of legal order that these terms have been used to describe. Their motives were similar: they sought a demystified and de-ideologized language which respected the fact-value distinction, and the distinction between sociology and jurisprudence. Weber’s category of rational-legal authority was defined by the belief in an impersonal legal order to which officials submit; this was also Kelsen’s concept of the Grundnorm. Parallel to Weber, Kelsen used a strategy of de-ideologization to critique elements of the idea of “the rule of law,” such as the separation of powers. Their redescriptions are intentionally subversive. They show that there is nothing more to the “rule of law,” either in the realm of fact or the realm of legally meaningful norms, than conformity to the law itself.