Follow-up Note to the Eric Boström - Hans Henrik Bruun Zoom meeting.

Just as time was running out on our Zoom appointment with Max's ideal types, I ventured that Weber reckoned two thirds of his Objectivity essay was Rickert the other third him. BUT, as Hans Henrik pointed out, I got it the wrong way round. The last third of the essay was all Weber's own work: the ideal type presentation and his nominalist breakdown of the state.

In the Zoom meeting I was enthusing about the *Briefe 1903-1905* (II/4). As it happened I had been reading through the volume for the first time, tracking Weber's interaction with Georg Jellinek. Not on ideal types but Staatsrechtslehre. It's interesting, Weber is political, Jellinek is, well, juristic.

Reading through I noticed in how many letters Weber pushed and explained his two major achievements: the Objectivity essay and the Protestant ethic essays.
First, however, the letter I misread. It was to Georg von Below (17 July 1904), who had reviewed the essay in the *Beilage zur Allgemeinen Zeitung*. This I did not know and it is perhaps worth digging out - not that von Below is everybody's favourite historian. Incidentally, the scholarly apparatus in this volume is excellent.

Weber thanks von Below for his review - its conclusions did him too much service - and then: "Apart from what is for me the most important last third, the essay contains only the use of the ideas of my friend Rickert." Friend Rickert crops up repeatedly throughout the volume, and crediting Rickert with the first two thirds of the Objectivity essay is in itself worth noting. Indeed, to be heretical, the last third is "most important" for Weber, but perhaps the first two thirds are more important in framing the interrelation of ontology, epistemology, methodology and how these can be logically analysed. As Eric suggested in the zoom, this is the primal question in all human and social science.

So what, according to these letters, did Weber learn and take from Rickert? As an overall comment, Weber did not like strong methodological programmes for the cultural and social sciences, especially those coming out of Leipzig. Wundt's monism, Lamprecht's collective psyches. The way forward was the neo-Kantianism as developed by Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert. The Objectivity essay, as he explains, can only be understood within this wider framework.

The letter to Willy Hellpach (31 March 1905) is where he suggests that Hellpach needs to read more Windelband and Rickert before he (Hellpach) criticizes them and that they have nothing to do with Stammler. Hellpach was arguing, in an article submitted to the Archiv - so Weber is acting as a referee - that Rickert and Windelband in their espousal of the Geisteswissenschaften were opposed to the nomothetic. Not so says Weber, the nomothetic is the whole subject of their study.

Letter to Rickert 2 April 1905. Rickert has indentified causality with Gesetzlichkeit (lawfulness), not so says Weber, a law can be used as a means of

attribution/imputation (Zurechnung). Weber says "systematic cultural sciences" is ambiguous, overlaps with generalizing. "A cross-section through the modern capitalist economic culture is eminently historical and is conducive to systematic form." The next sentence on ideal type requires more attention than this note.

Writing to Franz Eulenburg (16 April 1905), who was submitting a series of articles for Archiv on the critical analysis of recent philosophy of history, including Simmel, we have: Übrigens: dass Jemand, z.B. ich, Rickert für einen "grossen Mann" hielte, ist mir eigentlich nicht bekannt. Täte ja auch nichts zur Sache - freilich halte ich ihn für *einen unserer tüchtigsten Logiker*. Weber reports he is writing on causality (Kritische Studien). Das bringt Leben in die Bude!

28 April 1905, second round on systematic cultural sciences in letter to Rickert. The classifications of economists is systematic for teaching purposes (formation of an ideal type) and so preliminary to history, OR historical cross section as in Burkhardt's sense of history in Culture of Renaissance.

6 Sept 1905 to Eulenburg, Weber says Rickert's work is <u>not</u> a repeat of Dilthey but is in fact against it. And on 8 Sept, Rickert places social psychology under gesetzesbildende Wissenschaft and it is not its antithesis.

The letter to Willy Hellpach (10 Sept 1905) must have cost the Band editors considerable effort in ascertaining the details - it is an amazing letter, and has all the Rickertian features. Weber commends the separation of the logical, the substantive, and the methodological. The letter appears to turn on whether psychopathology can be clinically located somatically or whether, as Weber says, it is society that defines abnormality. Society's views are a product of cultural values of the time, and Weber is uneasy about where medical practitioners draw the line between their own values and clinical praxis. We also have Weber asking Hellpach to be clearer about types - does he mean 1) logically correct, 2) consistent expression of "Characteristikum" - "ideal purity" and individuality in specific cases, and conceptual ideal types, 3) average, empirical type.
Also in this letter, the relation between historical concrete individuals and their concrete causes, and the utilization of these by sociology, social psychology socialpathology as means for forming classificatory concepts.
Weber says his position is provisional on the above and is set out in Roscher und Knies II. Weber is to write (his critique of Eduard Meyer) on Rickertian *theoretical* "Beziehung auf Werthe" and its part in the forming of wissenschaftliche Objekte.

There is of course the very well known letter to Rickert (14 June 1904 - going back a year) on how Weber's ideal type differs from Jellinek's, the latter, in my view, having the clarity of separating the Sein-sollendes from the empirisch. Jellinek was also part of the Badenese intellectual milieu, so perhaps we should be talking about the plurality of ideal types, including the version<u>s</u> produced by Weber.